SOYUT GÖNDERME PROBLEMİ

Soyut gönderme problemi tümeller probleminin içerdiği problemlerden biri ve soyut tekil terimlerin gönderimini nasıl anladığımızla ilgilidir. “Kırmızı” ve “üçgen” gibi soyut tekil terimler doğru önermelerde yer aldıklarında nesnelere işaret ediyor gibi görünürler. Soyut tekil terimlerin gönderimi neyedir? Soyut gönderme problemine ilişkin yeterli görüş, soyut tekil terimlerin gönderimlerinin ne olduğunu açıklamak zorundadır. Adcılar, Metafiziksel Gerçekçiler ve Trop Adcıları arasında bu konuda bir uzlaşım yoktur. Gerçekçilik soyut tekil terimlerin tümellere işaret ettiğini iddia ederken, Trop Kuramı onların trop kümelerine işaret ettiğini kabul eder. Diğer taraftan, Adcılık soyut gönderme problemine çözüm sunmakta bazı güçlükler içindedir. Bu çalışmada soyut gönderme problemi Adcılık, Trop Kuramı ve Gerçekçilik açısından incelenecek ve kendi konumları açısından geçerli argümanlar sunan bu yaklaşımlar tartışılacaktır.

The Problem Of Abstract Reference

The problem of abstract reference is one of the problems which the problem of universals involve and is related to how we understand the reference of ‘abstract singular terms’. Abstract singular terms like ‘red’ and ‘triangularity’ appear within true sentences and they seem to denote objects. What abstract singular terms will denote? Any adequate theory of abstract reference must explicate what abstract singular terms will denote. There is no consensus on this question between Nominalist, Metaphysical Realist and Trope Nominalist. Realists claim that abstract singular terms stand for universals, and for Trope theory, they designate class of tropes. On the other hand, Nominalism will be in a difficulty to provide an answer to the problem of abstract reference. In this study, it is examined the problem of abstract reference from perspectives of Nominalism, Trope theory and Realism and also is discussed these accounts which all have valid arguments for their own position.

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